The UST sought to deny debtor’s discharge under § 727(a)(2) (transfer or concealment of property within a year of the petition or during the case with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor), § 727(a)(4)(A) (false oath or account), and § 727(a)(7) (acts proscribed by § 727(a)(2), (4) committed within a  year of the petition date in connection with another case concerning an insider). The Court allowed the UST to present evidence of an alleged fraudulent scheme under the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) to the extent such evidence was relevant to prove the intent requirements necessary to deny debtor’s discharge. Notwithstanding substantial evidence of PPP loan improprieties, the Court found that debtor’s testimony was credible and concluded that the UST did not meet her burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that debtor, in connection with another bankruptcy case in which debtor was an insider, fraudulently made a false oath or account at the meeting of creditors, or caused or permitted the transfer of approximately $352,000 with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

Chapter 13 debtor’s counsel filed a second fee application. The first fee application had been granted. The court reviewed the amounts billed for the first and second applications and compared the amounts to the results obtained in the case. The court disallowed most of the fees sought in the second application because the combined fees were too high for the relatively simple case.

Plaintiff was appointed guardian ad litem in defendant/debtor’s divorce case, to represent the interests of defendant’s infant daughter. At the conclusion of the divorce and custody proceedings, defendant filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy case and took the position that the guardian ad litem fees he owed were dischargeable. Plaintiff argued that the fees were in the nature of child support and therefore nondischargeable. The court ruled that under Tenth Circuit precedence, the fees were nondischargeable child support.

The Court held that the above-median-income Debtor who has no rent or mortgage expense but who pays for cell phone service and seasonal fuel costs is entitled to deduct the entire amount of the IRS Local Housing and Utilities Standard in computing disposable income. The Chapter 13 Trustee objected to confirmation of Debtor’s chapter 13 plan asserting that the IRS Local Housing and Utilities Standard is not “applicable” to Debtor because she has no mortgage or rent expenses and, therefore, she is not entitled any deduction under the IRS Local Housing and Utilities Standard. Her fiancé pays the mortgage on the home that he owns and where they jointly reside. The Court found that the IRS Local Housing and Utilities Standard is “applicable to Debtor” because she has as least one expense covered by the Standard.

The Court then addressed the division of the IRS Local Housing and Utilities Standard on Official Form 122C-2, which is mandatory. Form 122C-2 divides the Standard into “Mortgage or Rent Expenses” and “Insurance and Operating Expenses,” with separate deductible limits, in accordance with the UST’s division of the Standard. The Court found that the IRS Local Housing and Utilities Standard as adopted by the IRS is a single category and that mandating Debtor’s use of the separate categories for “Mortgage or Rent Expenses” and “Insurance and Operating Expenses” would impermissibly conflict with the Code. Nevertheless, the Court found that Form 122C-2 is valid because Line 10 allows a debtor without a mortgage or rent expense to claim the entire amount of the IRS Local Housing and Utilities Standard if the debtor claims that the UST’s division of the IRS Local Housing and Utilities Standard is incorrect and it affects the calculation of the debtor’s monthly expenses.